Origins of the Cold War Packet

Why did the USSR and the USA emerge as superpowers. Make sure you specify the military, economic, and Political reasons.

With reference to the military aspects, the USA and USSR became superpowers because they became the predominant air force and land force sectors of the world, respectively. Likewise, this meant that France and Great Britain had fallen behind due to their inabilities to triumph, which with the loss of Germany left Russia as the sole militant stronghold of the region. From the economic standpoint the USA stood far above due to the growth of their economy during the war, their commitment to open trade, and the pure strength that could secure European recovery. In turn, the small European countries that are not self-sufficient could now turn to the USSR for support locally. Finally, on a political level both stood out as superpowers because, one, they had outlasted fascism to make democracy, and to an extent communism, seem like the victor, and two, left the post war world extremely mold able.

Part 2 of the packet outlines 8 steps that lead to the Cold War. Please identify these and then briefly describe each.

 Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam Soviet action was the basis of the Long Telegram and the Iron Curtain speech 

2.The Long Telegram, February 22 1946 Shaped US foreign policy: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

3. The Iron Curtain Speech, March 6 1946- Shaped US foreign policy: Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan

4. The Truman Doctrine, March 12 1946- A result of the Iron Curtain Speech and the Long Telegram

5. The Marshall Plan, June 5 1947- Broader application of the principles behind the Truman Doctrine.- Congress was compelled to pass the Marshall Plan after the Czech Coup.

6. Red Army occupation of Eastern Europe, 1945-7- Contributed to need for containment.

7. Czechoslovakia Coup, February 1948- Direct cause for the Marshall Plan.- Contributed to need for containment.

8. Berlin Blockade, June 1948- First direct confrontation between the US and the USSR in a proxy location.

Dyer on Total War

The development of warfare from being mass warfare to the much debated reality if total war occurred out of a sense of greed for undeniable victory and self consumed power. The idea was developed in little more than a century time wise in the post French Revolution world; it reached a fever pitch in World War I before manifesting to its primitive form within the Second World War. The overall idea is in order to obtain a total victory a state must put forth all assets in the pursuit of said victory. This pursuit does not just mean utilizing all military based resources for the war but rather than all aspects of the economy and population (2/3 of the German male population aged 18-45 served in the military for the Second World War) have a focus or involvement in the war, as illustrated by the bonds, rationing and restructuring done during both World Wars. This was because, in reality, the victory of the war was going to come down to who could maintain a higher quality for longer - the long distance runner who starts a tad slower will out last and supersede the glamorous sprinter. The development of Total War becoming a reality over Mass Warfare was also elucidated in how many nations had mass overhauls of leadership in the years after. Germany and Italy both had relatively slow changes in comparison to the Russians who saw a exponential rise of communism, resulting in the idea of strong, dictatorial leaders becoming a consequence of Total War if precautions are not taken. The outcome of the war became less defining of the dignity of a group them it did the potential for an overhaul typically reserved for civil wars; however, the civl war has the succeeding party already mighty and prevalent where as Total War appears to allow for a weakness in a government that a dictator can capitalize on.
On top of this, the military was not only utilized entirely but made extreme leaps forward in lethality and weapon development. The ideal weapon for Total War is air bombing due to its destructive potential in proportion to the amount of people it risks. The problem with it was that between navigation and quality of planes the effectiveness of air bombing was limited. With that said, the utilization of airplanes in a more ambitious and consistent way than in the First World War lead to the rise of firestorm; it effectively destroyed entire cities throughout the war, and the ones that didn't suffered from carbon monoxide. Perhaps the most significant development from Mass War to Total War, was the development of the atomic bomb in the Manhattan Project by the United States. This project embodied the concept of Total War entirely because of the new pinnacle of destruction it reached as an increasing amount of money and science became focused upon the patriotic action of supporting the war.

WWII in Europe continued pg 150-156

1. Richard Overy argues that "The war was won in 1945 not from German weaknesses but from Allied strengths." How far do you agree with this statement.

For the most part, the claim made by Richard Overy is an undoubtedly true sentiment. For instance, the greatest factor in determining which side would rise to prominence was undoubtedly economic potential and size. This is seen early in the war as being in Germany's favor as they quickly defeated the French with Blitzkrieg tactics and is still relevant throughout the entirety of the war. The Allies especially excelled in this area once the United States firmly joined the war since there ability to transform into a wartime economy enabled the transition of spending for effective military efforts, reaching a capacity of 70,000 tanks and 120,000 aircraft for use in the war. Russia was in a similar situation, defying their earlier shortcoming in military preparation, with the result of having a production system that was more abundant and of higher quality than Germany for most of the war. This economic superiority was quintessential in the Allied victory over the Axis for the strength it offered in growth as the German economy began to struggle.

In turn, the Allies also reached a superior pinnacle in how they organized and managed the military actions more effectively than the Axis. Although they did not have the same caliber of plans as Sickle Stroke for instant domination, the choices made catalyzed the potential to maintain a successful offensive/defensive for longer. The Allies had developed a capacity for setting up civilian support, constantly improving quality of objectives/technology, and back up services. In doing so, they developed a constant flow of funding and resources, the USA avidly did bonds and rationing during the era, that could be directed towards the war as the nations focused intensely on becoming victorious. For the Pacific arena the organization and depth was so strong that for each servicemen there was they had 18 people acting as support for him. The result of this, mixed with the Allied desperation to win, meant that the Allies were unparalleled in terms of strength and found a way to view the war as a "just" war that was deserving of full commitment.

With that said, the strength of the Allies would not have prevailed as easily as it did, probably even resulting in a more prolonged war, if not for the Axis weaknesses. The greatest factor that was quintessential to the loss on the German part is the deterioration of properly thought out and executed plans. The war started with quick takeovers of Poland and France, but when plans to defeat Britain were placed into action there was a loss of focus. This loss of focus in most evident in how the Nazis changed there focus from Airfields to Cities and allowed for somewhat of a recuperation period for the Royal Air Force; it was revealing of the flawed ideas and leadership since they invaded into Russia before they could truly handle it (aka a second two-front war). Likewise, the dependency of Italy on German help was a continuous drain on resources and time, the delay because Balkan assistance was imperative to the outcome to Operation Barbarossa  that further weakened an economy already below par with the combined of their opponents. These weaknesses definitely helped the Allies get to their victory, but the extent to which they effected the outcome were merely in terms of the timing it ended.

Pages 146-149 WWII in Europe

1. Why did Hitler assume that his airforce could defeat Britain alone?
1.  There was the perceived idea that Germany had better aircraft that would prove more successful and dominate the Royal Air force; however, this was a misjudgement - the planes were excellent fighters but had limited fuel. Plus, his main goal was to get some form of peace agreement in the first place, so he possibly had the intention of just getting them tired enough to give in and make a deal.
2. What factor, in your opinion, was the most important in Britain's victory in the Battle of Britain?
1. The most important factor was the strategic errors made by Hitler. His choice to move his attention away the airfields and into the city not only allowed them time to prepare, repair, and bounce back, as the reading says, but also magnified the weaknesses of the fuel usage by the Germany fleet. In turn, it helped emphasize how they were impaired by using bases in their newly conquered territories instead of their home bases that had long been adapted to the needed usage.
3. Why did Hitler invade into the Balkans and why was this significant?
1. Hitler joined the Italian invasion into the Balkans because Mussolini was not going to succeed in his aims due to Allie involvement. When Hitler entered into the area, it impaired the Allie efforts (especially since it also weakened North Africa for Rommel to continue moving). With that said, it also served as an impairment to Germany for how it postponed the attack on the USSR.
4. What were Hitler's motives for attacking the USSR?
1. He viewed the nation as being inferior to the German people (ie. Salvs) and adopted the international hatred for the Communist ideology. In fact, the whole idea of Communism is what Hitler perceived as the biggest threat to his burgeoning German culture and ideal. Due to this, it had been his intent of the war the entire time; he just had to deal with France and Britain first to avoid unforeseen conflicts that would impair his plans.
5. What factors slowed the initial blitzkrieg of Russia?
1. The factors that impaired the initial Blitzkrieg of Russia were numerous. For one, Great Britain would not forfeit into a peace agreement as Hitler had hoped; instead they had to endure the long Battle of Britain. Likewise, the failure of Mussolini in the Balkans and Egypt meant that Hitler had to support his Allie and pushed back plans even further. With that said, these events that slowed down the initial attack from occurring meant that the time window was smaller and allowed for the USSR to be slightly more prepared than they would have been (not because they listened to warnings, but because they were slowly rebuilding their military status in general).

Pregnant With War

           What Keegan meant when he insinuated that the "twentieth century European civilization was pregnant with war" is that each development that happened in the preceding years, even century, had been nurturing the idea. For instance, the increase in population was being developed in a manner that with each passing decade made them more physically capable for combat, utilizing the increased accessibility of food resources. Likewise, the improved standard of living conditions blended with the mounting nationalism felt throughout the nations, originating from the industrialization and conditions post First World War, until it reached a pinnacle point. That point being characterized by how no one was going to allow for their quality of life to be diminished in this post-war society to be fair but rather expend effort on expanding their reach of influence as far as possible, specifically countries attempting to grow like Germany and Italy. Besides that, the defining values for the people during said time were the concepts of liberty, equality, and fraternity. A trifecta of ego fueled superiority as this was the causation of an increasing power thirst as the necessary military resources were being built in reserve at this point, essentially the desire to prove their "superiority" of strength. In the end, it is a disheartening reality that war was inevitable for Europe at this point in civilization because everything available held the capacity to be destructive and individuals in the society had the vision of how to use it for their gain, and that of their nation.

WWII Timeline 1939-1940

Why did collective security fail to keep the peace between 1920 and 1935?

Collective Security failed because the method chosen to attempt it, the League of Nations, was poorly designed in its plans versus intent form the very beginning. The League of Nations was formed with the intent of maintaining peace after the devastation of the First World War. It was, in an essence, supposed to be a parental governing figure for the world as its children. Each time there was an argument or conflict the country who was the victim would be protected while the aggressor sibling was met with threats and then punishment. It began with an attempt to reach a calm, mutual agreement before escalating to have implications on finances and moral codes. The League of Nations, although a good idea, could hardly work at all for the very same reasons that the analogy above results in tension until someone leaves: it places expectations for how people behave too high. In a sense, the program expected people to act benevolently towards others instead of attempting to ensure they're own successes in the same manner that Communism expects people to behave economically; both theories may sound appealing but the execution is impossible. Besides the irrational expectation that a country will prevent their own progression in favor of allowing another to maintain they're standard for life, the grandiose issue found within the Covenant is in fact how much of it wasn't even dedicated to the maintaining of peace in the practical military sense. Over half of the articles were dedicated to details of minimal importance such as Membership (1-7), Characteristics of a good member (18-21, and even some consumed with humanitarian/charitable causes (23, 25), resulting in an organisation who in retrospect looks more like a service group than an international peace maintenance committee. The rational behind why collective security failed in the 1930s is that the League was faced with three key issues that manifested in smaller events to be detrimental. For one, the Great Depression led to countries focusing more on their own personal issues and being hesitant to spend money on causes not directly effecting them (see the United States - though not a member- and Great Britain). Secondly, the state of many of the countries on a political level had made Europe unstable, whether it be the rise of Communism or dictatorial power as in Russia and Germany or the attempt to stand on their own after centuries of being an empire as it was for much of Central Europe. Finally, the most important catalyst was perhaps that key members, like Italy and Japan, began to blatantly disobey the rules of the League to expand their kingdom and League attempted to appease rather than be the forceful hand they claimed to be, breaking down functionally and viably to do what it was intended to until it deteriorated completely.